Linear constraints occur naturally in many reasoning problems and the information that they represent is often uncertain. There is a difficulty in applying AI uncertainty formalisms to this situation, as their representation of the underlying logic, either as a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities, or with a propositional or a predicate logic, is inappropriate (or at least unhelpful). To overcome this difficulty, we express reasoning with linear constraints as a logic, and develop the formalisms based on this different underlying logic. We focus in particular on a possibilistic logic representation of uncertain linear constraints, a lattice-valued possibilistic logic, an assumption-based reasoning formalism and a Dempster-Shafer representation, proving some fundamental results for these extended systems. Our results on extending uncertainty formalisms also apply to a very general class of underlying monotonic logics.
Introduction
Many reasoning problems involve linear constraints restricting the possible values of real-valued variables; in particular temporal and spatial problems can involve linear constraints representing relationships between temporal variables and between spatial variables, see e.g., [16, 26, 7] . Such constraints can often represent information that is uncertain. Many formalisms for representing and reasoning with uncertain information have been developed. The underlying logical information is typically expressed as a finite set of possibilities, or using propositional calculus, or sometimes first order predicate calculus. One can sometimes convert linear constraints to a discrete (e.g., propositional) form, but this can make the representation very cumbersome, and the important metric information will tend to be hidden. Furthermore, discrete representations cannot take the continuous nature of space and time into account, for which it can be natural to have continuously graded representations of uncertainty. For example, based on different sets of map data, we may have (for example, in a Dempster-Shafer representation) a degree of belief of 0.8 that a well is more than 5 m from a property boundary, and a degree of belief of 0.7 that it is more than 8 m away. The degree of belief that it is more than 7 m from the boundary will tend to be more than 0.7 and less than 0.8; in fact, the degree of belief may well vary continuously with the distance from the boundary.
It can therefore be preferable and more natural to represent linear constraints (and more general kinds of constraint) directly, and extend the uncertainty theories to reason with these. We approach this problem by expressing linear constraints in a logic (Section 2.1) and generalising uncertainty formalisms by defining them over this logic. These are illustrated in terms of a simple example, based on a real application of reasoning with uncertain geographic information. Our approach to generalising uncertainty formalisms applies for a very general class of underlying logics, which we define formally in Section 2.2; this includes logics which can reason with disjunctions of linear constraints, or even non-linear constraints, allowing, for example, more expressive representations of spatial boundaries.
The basic idea behind the generalisation of uncertainty formalisms is to consider the uncertainty theories over (finite or infinite) sets of possibilities, and associate a constraint with its semantics. For example, suppose that c is a constraint on a set of real-valued variables, and let [c] be the set of all assignments that satisfy the constraint c. Then (for example) the degree of belief of c is defined to be the degree of belief of the set [c] . This kind of approach can be used to extend logic-based formalisms, such as various non-monotonic logics and belief revision formalisms. In this paper we focus on formalisms which involve some kind of grade or degree of support being allocated to propositions. The grades of support may be totally ordered: as in DempsterShafer beliefs, or necessity values in possibility theory and possibilistic logic; or only partially ordered as in lattice-valued possibilistic logic and the generalised assumption-based reasoning formalism. Partially ordered degrees of support can be natural, for example, when one has information from two sources, and we do not know which of the sources is more reliable. The degrees of belief are interpreted probabilistically in DempsterShafer theory, and more qualitatively in the other formalisms considered, where the grades may just represent ordering information amongst strengths of belief.
We consider possibilistic logic in Section 3, where we show (Theorem 2) how deduction in the possibilistic logic can be achieved using deduction in the underlying logic. In Section 4 we generate a system of lattice-valued possibilistic logic, based on linear constraints or other underlying monotonic logics; in a similar way we generate a generalised assumption-based reasoning formalism. For each of these we give a sound and complete proof theory. In Section 5 we show how one can extend Dempster-Shafer theory.
Underlying monotonic logics
In this section we define the underlying logics for the generalised uncertainty formalisms constructed in Sections 3-5. First we consider a logic of linear constraints. Then, in Section 2.2 we consider a general class of monotonic logics.
A logic of linear constraints
We describe, in this section, a logical representation of linear P-constraints, with a semantics and a proof theory that is sound and complete for finite sets of constraints. We consider linear constraints of the following form: a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n P a 0 , where a 0 , . . . , a n are known real numbers, and x 1 , . . . , x n are unknown real numbers, often representing some physical quantities that we are interested in, but only have partial information about. This constraint is saying that the unknown vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) must be such that a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n P a 0 holds.
The language
Let V = {X 1 , . . . , X n } be a finite set of real-valued variables. 1 We are interested in linear constraints on V of the form a 1 X 1 + Á Á Á + a n X n P a 0 . Formally we define a (linear) constraint a to be a real-valued function on {0, . . . , n}, where a(i) is usually written a i . Let L be the set of all such (linear) constraints. Define a model x to be a real-valued function on the set {1, . . . , n}. x(i), usually written x i , is interpreted as a value of the variable X i . Let M be the set of all models. We say that model x satisfies a, written x a, if and only if a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n P a 0 .
Element a of L represents the inequality: P n i¼1 a i X i P a 0 . We will usually slightly abuse the notation and write elements of L as linear inequalities P n i¼1 a i x i P a 0 , or some equivalent form such as P i À a i x i 6 Àa 0 . We label three special constraints as >, > 0 and ?, which are defined as follows: for each i 2 {1, . . . , n}, >(i) = > 0 (i) = ?(i) = 0, and >(0) = À 1, > 0 (0) = 0 and ?(0) = 1. Thus > can be considered as the constraint 0 P À 1, > 0 as 0 P 0 and ? as 0 P 1. > and > 0 are satisfied by every model x, and ? is satisfied by none. Constraints can be added, and multiplied by real-valued scalars: for constraints a,b and real number r, constraint a + b is defined by (a + b) i = a i + b i for all i, and ra is defined by (ra) i = ra i for all i.
The language can also be used to represent constraints with 6 replacing P, and also linear equalities. A constraint a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n 6 a 0 can be written as (Àa 1 )x 1 + Á Á Á + (Àa n )x n P À a 0 , so is equivalent to the constraint Àa. (x satisfies the former constraint if and only if it satisfies Àa.) The linear equality a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n = a 0 holds if and only if both a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n P a 0 and a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n 6 a 0 hold so is equivalent to the pair of constraints {a, Àa}. We could also easily extend the language to include strict constraints of the form a 1 x 1 + Á Á Á + a n x n > a 0 though, to keep the language simpler, we do not do so here.
Here are a few examples of constraints that can be represented using this language: (1)
.6]; (6) the absolute value of x 1 À x 2 is not more than 5; (7) the arithmetic mean of x 1 , x 2 and x 3 is 4.3.
Consistency and semantic consequence
Suppose we have a set A of constraints on unknown x. We say, in the usual way, that x satisfies A (written x A) if and only if x satisfies every member of A, i.e., x a for all a 2 A. Let [A] be the set of x 2 M that satisfy A, i.e., ½A ¼ fx 2 M : x Ag. A is said to be consistent if it has a model, i.e., if [A] is non-empty; otherwise it is said to be inconsistent. We would like to be able to talk about what constraints b necessarily follow from those in A. Formally we define semantic consequence relation by A B if and only if every element b of B is satisfied by every model of A, i.e., [A] [B] . Set of constraints A is inconsistent if and only if A {?}, since ? has no model. By its construction, semantic consequence is a reflexive, transitive and hence monotonic consequence relation. However, it is not compact; for example, if a k is the constraint x 1 P k then A = {a k : k = 1,2. . .} is inconsistent, but every finite subset of A is consistent.
Syntactic consequence
Consider the proof theory generated by the axioms > and > 0 and inference rule schemas (where a and b are arbitrary elements of L):
For any real r > 0, From a deduce ra. From a and b deduce a + b. For any constraint a, From ? deduce a.
For set of constraints A and constraint b we say in the usual way that b can be proved from A, written A ' b, if b can be derived from applying iteratively the above inference rules to A and the axioms > and
Any such (finitary) syntactic consequence relation ' is compact by definition, so we can not hope for full completeness, as is not compact. However, we have, by well-known fundamental results for linear programming (see e.g., Chapter 1 of [29] ) the following result (see [33] ). In practice, one will use more developed tools for finding the consequences of a set of such constraints: for general problems, linear programming techniques; for particular sparse systems, Fourier elimination can be efficient; or fast algorithms for special kinds of constraints, such as simple temporal networks [7] .
The expression of reasoning with linear constraints as a logic makes it easy to generalise many (in particular non-monotonic) extensions of classical logics to linear constraints. The logic described above is closely related to the logic of probability described in [36] the main difference being that the latter has some additional axioms, because of models being probability functions which are non-negative. The methods for producing nonmonotonic extensions to this logic of probability can be adapted to produce non-monotonic logics of linear constraints. In particular, the definition of a default logic of probability in [36] (related to Reiter's default logic [25] ) carries over immediately to a default logic of (finite sets of) linear constraints; this involves defaults of the form A : B/C for finite subsets A, B, and C of L, which is intended to represent that one should deduce C if one knows A, given that B is consistent with what is known.
Flooded river example
We illustrate the techniques using an example, which is based on a real application studied by Damien Raclot and Christian Puech [23, 24] (see also other work, from the REVIGIS project, on this topic: [37, 15, 17, 2] ). An area of land surrounding a flooded river is analysed using aerial photographs and other sources of information, such as elevation models. It is divided up into n parcels of land, or compartments, which are small enough so that it can be assumed that the water level is constant within a compartment. Each of these compartments is either partially or completely flooded. Let x i be the water level (in decimetres above a fixed base level) of compartment i.
The purpose of the analysis is to deduce information about the levels x i for various compartments i. Expert analysis of the aerial photographs, in conjunction with the other sources of information, generates constraints of the following forms: upper bounds of the form x i 6 s, and lower bounds of the form: x i P r (where r and s are given numbers) and simple linear constraints of the form x j P x i , which we call a flow, since it corresponds to a flow of water from compartment j down to compartment i, which is observable in the photograph. For example, a lower bound can arise from knowledge of the elevation of a flooded compartment, and an upper bound through an observation that a vine is partially submerged. Both types of information (bounds and flows) are uncertain, but the flows are considered as less uncertain than the bounds.
Ignoring the uncertainty, this is a special kind of simple temporal problem [7] (though the variables are spatial rather than temporal, and the variables are state variables as opposed to decision variables); a simple linear time algorithm can be used involving both upstream and downstream propagations [24, 33] , to test consistency and generate inferred bounds on the variables. However, this is not so useful on its own since the input information in the application may well be inconsistent, because e.g., of mis-estimation of elevations.
A general class of monotonic logics
The initial motivation of this work was to extend various uncertainty formalisms to linear constraints. However, our approaches in Sections 3-5 apply to much more general logics, which we refer to here as ''monotonic model-theoretic logics''. These include many classical logics, and also logics which allow disjunctions, negations and conjunctions of linear constraints, as well as non-linear constraints. In particular, allowing disjunctions of linear constraints [20] greatly increases the expressive power, for example, allowing disjunctive temporal problems to be represented [7] , or allowing non-convex spatial polygons.
Formally, we define a monotonic model-theoretic logic to be a triple hL; M; i, where L and M are sets and M Â L is a relation between them. L is called the language and M is called the set of models. Relation is used to build a semantic entailment relation (which is also called ) between subsets of the language. We use similar definitions as those in Section 2.1 for this more general situation. For model x 2 M and a 2 L we say that x satisfies a if x a (i.e., if (x, a) 2 ). For A L we say that x satisfies A, written x A, if x satisfies every element of A. The relation between subsets of the language is reflexive, monotonic and transitive. Specifically, if
And, if A B and B C then A C.
We will sometimes also assume that L contains an inconsistent element ?, so that [?] = ;. (This is not a restrictive assumption, since if L does not contain such an element, we can add one to L.) Then, A ( L) is inconsistent if and only if A ?.
Extending possibilistic logic
In this section it is shown how possibilistic logic [10, 12] can be extended to deal with linear constraints, and the other more general logics we are considering. In possibility theory [11] , degrees of certainty-which are called 'necessity'-are assumed to be totally ordered and representable by numbers in [0, 1]; a necessity value of 1, for a proposition, means that the proposition is considered completely certain; a value of 0 means no certainty at all. If the necessity of a is greater than the necessity of b, then a is considered to be better supported by our information than b is. Possibilistic logic involves reasoning about the degrees of necessity of different propositions of interest. In (standard) possibilistic logic, the lower bound of the necessity value of each of a set of propositions is given; from these we wish to deduce the implied (lower bounds for) necessity values of further propositions of interest. For more details about possibilistic logic, see [10, 14, 21, 12] and other papers referenced in the survey [12] .
Possibility distributions, measures and necessity measures
Let X be a (finite or infinite) set, representing a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities. A possibility distribution on X is defined to be a function p : X ! [0, 1]. The associated possibility measure Poss p :
. This is intended to represent degrees of support for subsets of X. Note that we are considering unnormalised possibility distributions, possibility measures and necessity measures, i.e., we are not assuming that sup x2X p(x) = 1, or Poss(X) = 1 or that Nec(;) = 0.
Possibility measures and necessity measures on logical language L
We consider any monotonic model-theoretic logic hL; M; i, as defined in Section 2.2. A possibility distribution p on M induces a possibility measure and a necessity measure on 2 M , which induce values of possibility and necessity for L by the semantics. We define Nec p (a) = Nec p ([a]) and Poss
We are interested in statements of the form Nec(a) P a, which we abbreviate to (a, a), where a 2 L and a 2 [0, 1]. Such a pair is called a necessity-valued formula (over L) [10] . It gives a lower bound on the degree of support for a. We assume a set of such pairs, and we will deduce further pairs from this, implying which elements of the language are best supported. A set A of necessity-valued formulae is called a necessity-valued knowledge base (over L). A can be thought of as an imprecise specification of a necessity measure, and therefore constrains the associated (unknown) possibility distribution p : M ! ½0; 1. Possibility distribution p is said to satisfy a necessity-valued formula (a, a) if and only if its associated necessity measure Nec p satisfies Nec p (a) P a. We write in this case that p (a, a). As in the usual possibilistic logic, we have a simpler characterisation of this condition, which is easily proved. Lemma 1. Possibility distribution p satisfies necessity-valued formula (a, a) if and only if p(x) 6 1 À a for all x 2 M such that x 2 a.
Proof. p (a, a) if and only if Nec p (a) P a which is if and only if Poss p ðM À ½aÞ 6 1 À a which is if and only if supfpðxÞ : x 2 M À ½ag 6 1 À a, i.e., sup{p(x) : x 2 a} 6 1 À a. This holds if and only if p(x) 6 1 À a for all x such that x 2 a. h
We say that p satisfies necessity-valued knowledge base A if and only if p satisfies each of the necessityvalued formulae in A. The entailment relation for this possibilistic logic is defined as follows: we say that A entails pair (b, b), written A ðb; bÞ, if and only if p (b, b) for all p such that p A. In other words, A ðb; bÞ if and only if the necessity constraints corresponding to A imply that Nec(b) P b.
Let A be a necessity-valued knowledge base over L, and let a 2 [0, 1]. Define the a-cut A a to be fða; cÞ 2 A : c P ag, the set of necessity-valued formulae whose necessity is at least a. We also define, A Ã a to be the classical projection of the a-cut, so that a 2 A Ã a if and only if there exists a pair (a, c) in A for some c P a.
Given a necessity-valued knowledge base A we would like procedures that enable us to deduce necessity-value formulae which are consequences of A. In addition, given b 2 L, we would like to be able to determine the best lower bound on the necessity of b that A implies; that is, we would like to compute Val A ðbÞ, which is defined to be supfb 2 ½0; 1 : A ðb; bÞg [10] . Val A ðbÞ can be considered as the implied necessity of b given A. We have the following key result for this possibilistic logic, which connects entailment in the possibilistic logic with entailment in the underlying (e.g., linear constraints) logic, via the use of classical projections of a-cuts. 
0 , which implies that 1 À c > 1 À a and so a > c; therefore a 2 A Ã c , and so, since x 0 A Ã c , we have x 0 a, i.e., x a. We have shown that p (a, a) for all ða; aÞ 2 A and therefore p A. This, together with p 2 (b, b), implies that A2ðb; bÞ, which contradicts our initial assumption. Hence A ðb; bÞ implies that for all c < b, A c with x 2 a c , and so there exists a pair (a c , a) in A for some a P c. Using the fact that p A, and hence p (a c , a), it follows using Lemma 1 that p(x) 6 1 À a, and so p(x) 6 1 À c.
Hence p(x) 6 1 À c for all c < b, and so p(x) 6 s for all s > 1 À b, which implies that p(x) 6 1 À b, as required.
(
bÞ. Conversely, suppose that A is finite, and that A ðb; bÞ. Since A is finite we can choose c such that, for any pair (a, a) with a < b, we have Each value of b involves the checking of an inference in the language; computational efficiency of the procedure is therefore closely tied to the efficiency of deduction in the underlying logic (e.g., in the linear constraints case, this depends on the class of linear constraints used). For the finite case, the procedure will terminate with the maximal value Val A ðbÞ of b; for the case of infinite A, the procedure may have to terminate before it has found the maximal value. [12] .
Note that, in contrast with [10] , we allow a necessity-valued knowledge base to be infinite. This is natural in certain situations for representing continuously graded knowledge bases. Not all results for the finite case hold for the infinite case. For example, we have the following result, which is Proposition 11 of [10] 
Possibilistic constraints for the flooded river example
We can assign necessity values to the various bounds and flows in the flooding problem. Our inputs then consist of a set A of pairs (a, a) where a is a lower bound on the necessity of a, and a is either a flow, a lower bound or an upper bound.
For example, suppose a hut is observed partially submerged in compartment 49, giving us upper bound information regarding x 49 , the water level in that compartment. Our expert is confident (based on the digital elevation model for the ground level, and on an estimate of the height of the hut) that the elevation of the top of the hut is at most 120 dm (above the base level). If ''confident'' is taken to correspond to a necessity value of 0.6, then this gives rise to a statement Nec(x 49 6 120) P 0.6, and hence a necessity-valued formula ((x 49 6 120), 0.6). The expert tentatively believes-corresponding to necessity value 0.4-that the top of the hut's elevation is at most 110 dm, leading to pair ((x 49 6 110), 0.4). A flow is observed from compartment 49 down to compartment 86; and this is considered as very reliable information, corresponding to a necessity value of 0.9. This gives rise to the necessity-valued formula ((x 86 6 x 49 ), 0.9). We can then deduce upper bound information on the level x 86 of the water in compartment 86: Nec(x 86 6 120) P 0.6 and Nec(x 86 6 110) P 0.4.
For any a appearing in some pair in the necessity-valued knowledge base A, we could compute, using the linear propagation algorithm, the bounds on each compartment level x i implied from A Ã a . All these bounds then have necessity value at least a. Given that A is finite, applying this approach for each a appearing in A will then give us the implied necessity value for each inferred bound.
An alternative approach is to adapt the propagation algorithm for the constraints to also propagate the necessities. The propagation of the bounds is based on inferences of the form: From lower bound x i P r and flow constraint x j P x i deduce lower bound x j P r. Similarly, for the possibilistic constraints, we can chain a lower bound pair (x i P r, a) and a flow pair (x j P x i , b) to get a lower bound pair (x j P r, min(a, b)). This approach generalises easily to the lattice-valued possibilistic logic and assumption-based reasoning approaches described in the next section. The propagation algorithms can be adapted in this way to compute the implied necessity values of lower and upper bounds. We can also determine?, the deduced necessity of ?.
The output of such an approach would be a set of upper bounds and lower bounds for each compartment variable, where each of these bounds has an associated necessity grade, and stronger bounds are associated with smaller necessity values. The strongest bounds with necessity values greater than? can therefore be considered as constraining the 'best guesses' for the water levels in the compartments. The weaker bounds, with higher necessity values, give us information we can be more confident in.
When dealing with continuous spatial or temporal variables, it can be natural to use a continuous representation of the uncertainty (which could be based on smooth interpolation of discrete information). For example, an expert might indicate, using a graphical user interface, that Nec(x 49 6 120 À 50k) P 0.6 À k for all k 2 [0, 0.6] (continuously extending the upper bound information on x 49 expressed above). This gives rise to an infinite necessity-valued knowledge base: {((x 49 6 120 À 50k),0.6 À k) : k 2 [0, 0.6]}.
Lattice-valued possibilistic logic and assumption-based reasoning
Possibilistic logic can be generalised to a situation where the values of necessity (i.e. the degrees of support) are in a distributive lattice [9, 10] ; see also [12] . Degrees of support which are only partially ordered occur naturally in many situations. For example, in the temporal situation described in [9] , or when there are independent sources of support with incomparable strengths. The grades of support could represent sets of scenarios; in that case, a has generalised necessity degree of at least a if a holds in the set of scenarios represented by a. Closely related partially ordered possibilistic logic systems (based on standard underlying logics) include those described in [3] and in Section 2.3 of [35] .
We first consider extending lattice-valued possibilistic logic to situations where the underlying logic is more general, that is, a monotonic model-theoretic logic hL; M; i, as defined in Section 2.2. In Section 4.3 we go on to consider a strongly related system of assumption-based reasoning.
Lattice-valued possibilistic logic
Let K ¼ ðK; 0; 1; V ; W Þ be a completely distributive lattice [5] , with greatest lower bound operation § and least upper bound operation ¤ on subsets of K. The associated partial order " on K is given in the usual way: a " b if and only if a^b (i.e., §{a, b}) = a.
Define the language P of this lattice-valued possibilistic logic to consist of all pairs (A, a), where A is a subset of the language L and a 2 K is a lattice element. For example, with the linear constraints language defined in Section 2.1, set A is interpreted as meaning that the true value x of the vector of real-valued variables satisfies each constraint in A. The values in the lattice K might be interpreted as truth values (or, alternatively, degrees of preference). The interpretation of (A, a) is then: the truth value of ''x satisfies A'' is at least a. Extending Standard Possibilistic Logic, we define the semantics is terms of generalised possibility distributions. In the standard case (Section 3), possibility distribution p satisfies pair (A, a) if and only if 1 À p(x) P a for all x such that x 2 A. However, we do not generally have an operation corresponding to 1 À (AE) within the lattice. To solve this problem we define a complementary scale for the possibility values.
Let K # K * be a bijection between K and some set K * , with a * being the image of a, and define (a * ) * = a. Generalised possibility distributions p are defined to be functions from M to K * . We say p satisfies (A, a) if for all x 2 M such that x 2 A, (p(x)) * # a. (To recover the usual definitions of possibility distribution, etc., we can set K = [0, 1] with the usual ordering, and set K * = [0, 1] and a * = 1 À a; cf. Lemma 1.) For D P and ðB; bÞ 2 P this gives the semantic consequence relation: D (B, b) if and only if p satisfies (B, b) for all p such that p satisfies (every pair in) D. Theorem 2 cannot be generalised to the lattice case (at least in a simple way) because of the potentially more complex structure of the lattice (in particular it being generally only partially ordered). However, we can still define a very simple sound and complete proof theory.
Proof theory
From (A, a) deduce (B, b) for all (B, b) such that A B and b " a.
Let D be a subset of P. Define the set of syntactic consequences CðDÞ of D to be the intersection of all sets C ð PÞ (which is the unique smallest set C) such that (i) C D and (ii) C is closed under the inference rules (i.e., if C contains an instance of the left-hand side of an inference rule then it contains the corresponding instance of the right-hand side). We then define the syntactic consequence relation ' by D ' (B, b) if and only if ðB; bÞ 2 CðDÞ. This leads to the following completeness result, which is proved in Section 4.4.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness of paired system). Let ðB; bÞ 2 P be a pair and let D P be a set of pairs. Then D (B, b) if and only if D ' (B, b) .
When D is finite the proof theory can be written in a simpler way, with the second and third inference rules being replaced by Even if D is infinite, if distributive lattice K is finite then we can rewrite D as the equivalent, but finite, set of pairs D 0 = {(A a , a) : a 2 K}, where, for given a 2 K, set A a is the union of A over all (A, a) 2 D, so we again could use the latter more usual (finitary) kind of proof theory.
Assumption-based reasoning
We can produce a related framework and achieve similar results for systems of pairs which may be viewed as generalised versions of assumption-based truth maintenance systems [6] . Consider a finite system of pairs of the form (A, /) where A is a subset of the language, and / is a formula in some propositional language R; formula / is intended to represent conditions under which constraints (or formulae) A are known to hold. For example, if an expert tells us that x 1 P 120 then we can construct a pair ({x 1 P 120}, p 1 ), where propositional symbol p 1 represents that the expert is being reliable here. To express logical relationships between these conditions, it can be useful also to allow an additional set of formulae T R, which are assumed to be true.
We define the semantics for this assumption-based reasoning systems as follows. Let X be the set of R-valuations satisfying T. Models are defined to be pairs (x, x) for x 2 M and x 2 X. Pair (x, x) represents a possible assignment to the propositional variables and also a model of the language L (which is an assignment to all the real-valued variables in the linear constraints case). Pair (A, /) restricts possible models (x, x), and is intended to represent that, if condition / holds, then all of A hold; we therefore say that (x, x) satisfies (A, /) if the following condition holds: [x satisfies /] implies x A. Hence (A, /) can be thought of as an implication: if / holds then A holds. As usual we extend this to a semantic consequence relation on pairs:
is satisfied by all (x, x) satisfying every element of D.
Define syntactic entailment ' using the following proof theory: Given set of pairs D, one can associate with a set B L a formula / B in R which expresses precisely the conditions under which B can be deduced; that is, D (B, /) if and only if T [ {/} / B (so that / B is a logically weakest formula such that (B, / B ) is deducible from D). If one had a probability measure on R, satisfying Pr(T) = 1, then this can be used to generate the probability that B can be deduced, i.e., Pr(/ B ), which can be considered as a degree of belief in B. An important special case is where D can be written as {(A i , p i ) : i = 1, . . . , m} where each p i is a propositional variable, and T = ;. This is an assumption-based system. If each p i is probabilistically independent of the others, and has a chance r i of holding, this generates a probability measure on R and hence degrees of belief. This situation corresponds to a special case of the generalised Dempster-Shafer theory described in Section 5, and is strongly related to work on probabilistic argumentation systems [13, 1] .
Proving Theorem 3
We consider a fixed (possibly infinite) set of pairs D P which we label as {(A i , a i ) : i 2 I}. Define, for Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 3. h Proof. For any r I, we have that CðDÞ contains {(A i , a i ) : i 2 r}. So by the third inference rule, CðDÞ contains (¨i 2r A i , § i2r a i ). Therefore, if r 2 S B then CðDÞ contains (B, § i2r a i ), using the first inference rule. Hence, by the second inference rule, CðDÞ contains B;
Proof. A lattice is said to be completely distributive if for any doubly indexed set {a r,s : r 2 R, s 2 S}, where the ¤ on the right-hand side is over all functions e from R to S.
Bg, let S = I, and define a x,i = a i if i 2 I x (i.e., if x 2 A i ), and, otherwise, let a x,i = 0, the minimum element of the lattice. Applying the completely distributive property gives because we need only consider functions e such that for all x 2 R, e(x) 2 I x , since other functions e just give rise to an element 0, which can be omitted from the application of ¤. Using idempotence of § and ¤, this last term can be written as ¤ r2Q a r , where Q is a particular set of subsets of I, and for r I, we define a r to be § i2r a i . A set r is in Q if and only if there exists some function e : R ! I such that e(x) 2 I x for all x 2 R, and r = {e(x) : x 2 R}. Putting these parts together we have that V x2B W i2Ix a i is equal to ¤ r2Q a r . Hence, to complete the proof, we just have to show that W r2Q a r ¼ W r2S B a r . We will first show that Q S B which implies that W r2Q a r " W r2S B a r . Consider any r 2 Q. Then for any x 2 B, there exists an element j = e(x) 2 r with j 2 I x , i.e., x 2 A j and hence x 2¨i 2r A i ; this proves thaẗ i2r A i B and hence r 2 S B , as required. We will now show that for any r 2 S B there exists an element r 0 2 Q with r 0 r, and hence a r 0 # a r , this proves that W 
Consider any x 2 M such that x 2¨i 2I A i . So there exists some i 2 I such that x 2 A i , which implies that (p(x)) * # a i and so (p(x)) * # § i2I a i , proving that p sat- 
Proving Theorem 4
One might prove Theorem 4 using the results of the last section. Here, however, we give a direct proof. We consider again a fixed set of pairs D, which we write as {(A i , / i ) : i 2 I}, where I is finite, since we are assuming that D is finite. For an arbitrary subset B of L, we let S B = {r I :¨i 2r A i B}.
The completeness part of the proof follows using the first two lemmas; soundness follows from Lemma 10.
Proof. The proof of this is very similar to that for Lemma 5. Consider any r 2 S B . Since r is finite, we can repeatedly apply the third inference rule, to show that D syntactically entails (¨i 2r A i , § i2r / i ). Since r 2 S B , we have¨i 2r A i B, so we can use the first inference rule to show that D syntactically entails (B, § i2r / i ).
Hence, by repeated application of the second inference rule, D syntactically entails B;
Proof. Suppose that D semantically entails (B, w), and consider any x 2 X such that x satisfies w. It is sufficient to show that x satisfies W r2S B V i2r / i . Consider any x 2 M such that x 2 B. Then (x, x) does not satisfy (B, w), so (x, x) does not satisfy D, by the definition of semantic consequence in the paired system. Hence there exists some i x 2 I such that (x, x) does not satisfy ðA i x ; / i x Þ, i.e., x satisfies / i x but x2A i x .
Define r x ¼ fi x : x 2 M; x 2 Bg. If x 2 M is such that x 2 B then x2A i x (as shown above) and so x2 S Proof. 
Extending Dempster-Shafer theory
This section shows how Dempster-Shafer theory can be extended to reason with linear constraints, and to the other monotonic logic formalisms we consider. See [19] for a somewhat related approach to Dempster-Shafer theory for spatial and temporal reasoning, and [4, 18] for other work on generalising Dempster-Shafer theory to logics.
Dempster-Shafer theory, with the view taken here, can be considered as representing situations where we have a probability distribution over a set, and a logical relation between the set and the propositions of interest. For example, in the flooded river problem, one such situation is if we have a probability distribution over the height of a vine, and the vine is only partially covered by the water, implying that the water level there is below the top of the vine. The probabilistic and logical information together can be used to generate degrees of belief in propositions of interest.
Basic definitions of Dempster-Shafer theory
The formalism of [27] was derived from that of [8] ; Dempster's framework is more convenient for our purposes, and we describe the mathematical basics of a slight variant of it (see [32] ).
Let H be a set, which is interpreted as a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions, or as a set of 'possible worlds'. H is known as a frame [of discernment]. The propositions of interest are all assumed to be expressed as subsets of the frame. An uncertain piece of information regarding H is represented as a source triple over H, which is defined to be a triple (X, P, C) where X is a set, P is a strictly positive probability distribution over X (so that for all x 2 X, P(x) 5 0) and C is a function from X to 2 H À {;}. So we have probabilistic information P about another set X, which is related to H by C. Mapping C expresses a logical connection between X and H: for x 2 X, C(x) is the set of elements of H which are compatible with x. Associated with a source triple S is a belief function Bel S : 2 H ! [0, 1] giving ''degrees of belief'' in subsets of the frame. We define Bel S (X) = P{x : C(x) X}, which is the probability that random set C(x) is a subset of X. Bel S (X) can be thought of as the probability that X is implied by the piece of uncertain information represented by the source triple. Belief functions are intended as representations of subjective degrees of belief, as described in [27, 28] .
Suppose we have a number of source triples over H each representing a separate piece of uncertain information. The combined effect of these, given the appropriate independence assumptions, is calculated using Dempster's rule (of combination). The result of applying Dempster's rule to a finite set of source triples {(X i ,P i , C i ), for i = 1,. . . , k}, is defined to be the source triple (X, P DS , C) over H, which is defined as follows.
and probability distribution P 0 on X · by P 0 ðxÞ ¼ Q k i¼1 P i ðxðiÞÞ, for x 2 X · . Let X be the set {x 2 X · :C 0 (x) 5 ;}, let C be C 0 restricted to X, and let probability function P DS on X be P 0 conditioned on X, so that for x 2 X, P DS (x) = P 0 (x)/P 0 (X). The combined measure of belief Bel over H is thus given, for X H, by Bel(X) = P DS ({x 2 X : C(x) X}).
Generalising Dempster-Shafer theory to other logics
We consider an underlying monotonic model-theoretic logic hL; M; i, as defined in Section 2.2. The definitions of the previous section can be extended easily to such logical languages via the semantics. Essentially, the belief of A L is defined to be the belief of [A] . Define a source triple over L to be a triple (X, P, C) where X is a set, P is a strictly positive probability function (i.e., probability density function or probability mass function) on X and C is a function from X to F, where F is the set of finite 2 consistent subsets of L. One interpretation of source triples is that we're interested in L, but we have Bayesian beliefs about X, and a logical connection between the two, expressed by C. The interpretation of C is that if the proposition represented by x is true, then the proposition represented by C(x) is also true.
We can associate with a source triple S = (X, P, C) over L a generalised belief function Bel S : L ! ½0; 1 giving degrees of belief in elements in the language L. This is given as follows: for a 2 L, Bel S (a) = P({x 2 X : C(x) a}) (assuming that this set is measurable), which we abbreviate to P(C (x) a) ; the belief in a is the probability that a is implied. We can also define Bel for finite subsets A of L in a similar fashion: Bel S (A) = P(C(x) A).
Source triple S = (X, P, C) over L corresponds to a source triple S 0 = (X, P, C 0 ) over the set of models M (as defined in the last section), where C 0 : X ! 2 M is given by, for x 2 X, C 0 (x) = [C(x)]. As one would hope, we then have, for A L, Bel S ðAÞ ¼ Bel S 0 ð½AÞ.
Dempster's rule of combination
Dempster's rule of combination can also be easily extended. Suppose we have a number of source triples (X i , P i , C i ), for i = 1,. . . , k, each representing a separate piece of uncertain information. The combination (X, P DS , C) of these source triples over L is defined as follows.
As in the last section, let
and probability function P 0 on X · by P 0ðxÞ ¼ Q k i¼1 P i ðxðiÞÞ, for x 2 X · . Let X be the set {x 2 X · : [C 0 (x)] 5 ;}, let C be C 0 restricted to X, and let probability function P DS on X be P 0 conditioned by X, so that for x 2 X, P DS (x) = P 0 (x)/P 0 (X) (given that P 0 (X) 5 0). The combined measure of belief Bel is the belief function associated with the combined source triple, and is thus given, for finite A L, by Bel(A) = P DS (C(x) A). For the linear constraints case, by Theorem 1, this equals P DS (C(x) ' A) since C(x) is a finite subset of L.
Computing combined belief
It is possible to adapt some of the standard approaches (see e.g., [32] ) for computing combined belief in this more general situation. In particular, various Monte-Carlo algorithms can be adapted to give arbitrarily close approximations of values of belief. We assume that we have some procedure for determining whether C(x) A holds or not.
Since, for finite A L, Bel(A) = P DS (C(x) A), to calculate Bel(A) we can repeat a large number of trials of a Monte-Carlo algorithm where for each trial, we pick x with chance P DS (x) and say that the trial succeeds if C(x) A, and fails otherwise. Bel(A) is then estimated by the proportion of the trials that succeed. The most straight-forward way is to pick x with chance P DS (x) by repeatedly (if necessary) picking x 2 X · with chance P 0 (x) until we get an x in X. Picking x with chance P 0 (x) is easy: for each i = 1,. . . , k, we pick x i 2 X i with chance P i (x i ) and let x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ). If the conflict probability 1 À P 0 (X) is bounded away from 1, this algorithm has low complexity, proportional to the complexity of proof in the logic [31, 32] , but with a high constant factor because of needing a large number of trials to achieve a good estimate of values of belief. If the conflict is very high, we would be better off using more complex Monte-Carlo algorithms, such as a Markov chain Monte-Carlo algorithm [22, 32] .
Dempster-Shafer approach for the flooded river example
An uncertain flow constraint x j P x i with reliability p 2 [0, 1] can be represented as a source triple ({x, x 0 }, P, C) over a linear constraints language L (see Section 2.1), with P(x) = p, P(x 0 ) = 1 À p and C(x) = {x j P x i }, and C(x 0 ) = {>}. This corresponds to a simple support function [27] . Given just this source triple, we can deduce the constraint x j P x i with chance p, so that the associated belief function has Bel({x j P x i }) = p.
Suppose we have uncertain lower bound information on x 2 , the water level in compartment 2, based on information from a digital elevation model and an observation that this compartment is flooded, which is represented by a source triple ({x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, P 2 , C 2 ) defined as follows: P 2 (x 1 ) = 0.5, P 2 (x 2 ) = 0.4 and P 2 (x 3 ) = 0.1; and C 2 (x 1 ) = (x 2 P 100), C 2 (x 2 ) = (x 2 P 90), and C 2 (x 3 ) = >. This leads to a belief function with Bel(x 2 P 100) = 0.5 (arising from a judgement that there is 50% chance that the elevation of this compartment is at least 100), and Bel(x 2 P 90) = 0.5 + 0.4 = 0.9. If we had just this source triple and an uncertain flow constraint x 8 P x 2 with reliability 0.95, then the combined belief that x 8 P 100 would be equal to 0.5 · 0.95 = 0.475. Note that a continuously graded representation of an uncertain bound can also be very natural, which requires the use of infinite X in the source triple; Monte-Carlo simulation can be still used for computation.
Given a large number of uncertain flow constraints and uncertain upper and lower bounds, we can represent each by source triples and combine them using Dempster's rule, given that the appropriate independence assumptions are satisfied. (It is also possible to model dependencies in the information, by constructing a different combined probability function from P DS .) We can then compute the combined beliefs in constraints of interest, or use a Monte-Carlo algorithm to approximate them. For example, if we find that Bel({x 6 P 120,x 6 6 130}) = 0.7 then it means that with chance 0.7 we can deduce that the level of compartment 6 is in the interval [120, 130] ; the value 0.7 can be viewed as a kind of lower probability for: x 6 2 [120, 130].
Summary
This paper shows how a number of important uncertainty formalisms can be extended to deal with uncertain linear constraints, and other logical formalisms. The formalisms we discuss are possibilistic logic, a latticevalued possibilistic logic, a general form of assumption-based reasoning, and Dempster-Shafer theory. We show how deductions can be made in this possibilistic logic, and how Dempster-Shafer algorithms can be adapted, and construct sound and complete proof theories for the lattice-valued possibilistic logic, and the assumption-based reasoning formalism.
